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Abstract. The main objective of this article is to develop scalable anomaly detectors for high-fidelity sim-
ulators of power systems. On the one hand, high-fidelity models are typically too complex to apply existing
model-based approaches in the fault/anomaly detection literature. On the other hand, pure data-driven ap-
proaches developed primarily in the machine learning literature neglect our knowledge about the underlying
dynamics of power systems. To address these shortcomings, we develop a data-assisted model-based diag-
nosis filter that utilizes both the model-based knowledge and also the simulation data from the simulator.
The diagnosis filter aims to achieve two desired features: (i) performance robustness with respect to output
mismatches; (ii) high scalability. To this end, we propose a tractable optimization-based reformulation in
which decisions are the filter parameters, the model-based information introduces feasible sets, and the data
from the simulator forms the objective function to-be-minimized regarding the effects of output mismatches
on the filter performance. To validate the theoretical results and its effectiveness, we implement the devel-
oped diagnosis filter in DIgSILENT PowerFactory to detect false data injection attacks on the Automatic
Generation Control measurements in the three-area IEEE 39-bus system.
1. Introduction
The principle of anomaly detection in power system cyber security is to generate a diagnostic signal (e.g.,
residual) which keeps sensitive to attacks but decoupled from other unknowns, given the available data from
system outputs. The detection methods can be mainly classified into two categories: (i) the approaches that
exploit the explicit mathematical model of the system dynamics (referred to model-based methods in this
article); (ii) the data-driven approaches that try to automatically learn the system characteristics from the
output data [17, 24]. Our work in [18] has developed a diagnosis tool to detect the class of multivariate
false data injection (FDI) attacks that may remain stealthy in view of a static detector, by capturing the
dynamics signatures of such a disruptive intrusion. This method is, indeed, model-based that the dynamics
of the system trajectories under the multivariate attacks are described via an explicit mathematical model
representation (i.e., linear differential-algebraic equations (DAEs)). The numerical results in [18] have proven
its effectiveness in the linearized mathematical model. Now here comes another question:
Can the power of scalable model-based diagnosis tools be still utilized in real-world applications such as
electric power systems for which there are reliable datasets from high-fidelity but complex simulators?
Literature on model-based and data-driven anomaly detection. Our objective in this article is to
address this question. Before answering that, we first provide a brief overview on the model-based and data-
driven detectors. In fact, both types have their own advantages and limitations. The model-based methods
require that the system dynamics must be well understood [21]. Observer-based residual generator is a major
subclass of these schemes. The modeling framework has been extended to general linear DAEs as many
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governing physical laws of power systems are made through differential equations [15, 2]. Parity space [16]
and parameter estimation [8] model-based methods have also been extensively investigated. For instance,
the extended Kalman filter algorithms is used to perform such an estimation for anomaly detection [9]. The
residual generators above usually have the same degree as the system dynamics, which can be problematic in
the online implementation particularly for large-scale power systems [5]. Our diagnosis filter in [18] provides
a good alternative to detect the disruptive multivariate attacks in a real-time operation. Still, the challenge
remains as the power system models are mostly nonlinear, complex and high-dimensional. The work in [12]
proposed an optimization-based filter for detecting a single fault in the scenario where the nonlinearity in the
control system model can be fully described. However, developing accurate mathematical models with all the
details of nonlinearities and uncertainties in power systems is usually difficult (or even infeasible), especially
in the case that some uncertainties can not be well quantified [22].
Another major technique for anomaly detection comes from data-driven approaches which do not require
an explicit mathematical model of the system dynamics. Developments such as sensing technology, Internet-
of-Things and Artificial Intelligence have contributed to a more data-driven power system. Anomaly detection
is mainly considered as a classification problem and there are supervised or unsupervised learning approaches
for that purpose. Among all the supervised classifications, deep neural networks (DNN) [25, 3], bayesian
networks [23] and Kernel machines [17] are the popular methods. For unsupervised classifications, one can find
principle component analysis (PCA) and its extensions [10, 6], autoencoders [1], etc. In addition to supervised
or unsupervised approaches, recent work in [11] has proposed a reinforcement learning based algorithm for
online attack detection without a prior knowledge of the system models or attack types. Overall, data-driven
methods are suitable for complex and large-scale power systems. However, their performance highly depends
on the quantity and quality of the accessible data [22], and thus can be intractable in many cases. Besides,
the required pre-processing stage (e.g., data training) may have a high computational cost.
Contributions and outline. This article aims to develop a scalable diagnosis filter for a high-fidelity but
complex simulator (e.g., DIgSILENT PowerFactory (PF)). We still utilize the model-based information to
build up a scalable filter design. But as noted earlier, output mismatches can be observed from the output of
the mathematical model in model-based detection and the one from the high-fidelity simulator. In this regard,
we propose a tractable optimization-based reformulation where the model-based information introduces fea-
sible sets, and the simulation data forms the objective function to minimize the effects of output mismatches
on the filter performance. In this way, the diagnosis filter can be “trained” in the normal operations (with-
out attacks) to have performance robustness with respect to the output mismatches. Then the robustified
diagnosis filter can be “tested” in PF to detect the occurrence of FDI attacks. Our main contributions are:
(i) Firstly, we depart from the pure model-based or data-driven viewpoints to develop a diagnosis filter
which uses both the model-based knowledge for a scalable design and the simulation data to robustify
itself to the output mismatches, yielding a novel data-assisted model-based approach. To quantify the
effects of output mismatches, a square of L2-inner product with corresponding norm is introduced
for the discrete-time signal in a finite time horizon. Subsequently, a robustification scheme in the
“training” phase is formulated as an optimization program where the effects of output mismatches
on the filter performance are minimized and the filter scalability are achieved (Definition 3.1 and
Remark 3.2).
(ii) We investigate the tractable optimization-based characterization of the diagnosis filter in both sce-
narios of univariate and multivariate attacks. The L2-norm of the residual part introduced by output
mismatches is reformulated as a quadratic function, and we further propose quadratic programming
characterization for the robust diagnosis filter under the univariate attack. The resulted filter can
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Figure 1. Configuration of the proposed solution.
even have non-zero steady-state residual that tracks the univariate attack value (Theorem 3.3). We
also extend the robust diagnosis filter design to solve the detection problem of multivariate attacks.
(Corollary 3.4).
The process of diagnosis filter construction and validation is concluded in Algorithm 1. Besides, the effec-
tiveness of the proposed approach is validated on the three-area IEEE 39-bus system. Numerical results from
the case study illustrate that the robust diagnosis filter for the PF simulator can successfully generate alerts
in the presence of FDI attacks, while a filter without such a robustification scheme may fail.
Section 2 presents the outline of our proposed solution. Both mathematical framework and motivating
cased study are detailed described. Section 3 proposes the tractable optimization-based characterization of the
diagnosis filter which has high scalability and performance robustness to the output mismatches. Numerical
results of the robust diagnosis filter in the case study are reported in Section 4.
2. Outline of the Proposed Solution
In this section, the mathematical framework of our proposed solution to design a diagnosis filter for the
high-fidelity simulator will be presented. We will also provide the motivating case study in power systems to
illustrate such a process.
2.1. Mathematical framework
The configuration of our approach to develop a diagnosis filter for the high-fidelity simulator (i.e., PF)
is presented in Figure 1. We aim to develop a filter which can generate a diagnostic signal (i.e., residual
r) to differentiate whether the measurements are a consequence of the normal disturbance input d, or due
to the anomaly signal f , given the available output data yp from the PF simulator. Besides, our proposed
solution builds on a new data-assisted model-based perspective that the filter utilizes not only the model-based
information for a scalable design but also the simulation data to “train” the filter to achieve performance
robustness to the output mismatches which can be characterized by e. Now we provide the mathematical
framework for the corresponding elements in Figure 1 of the filter configuration.
Let us start with the description of the mathematical model which is commonly used in the model-based
detection. This model-based information will provide feasible sets for the diagnosis filter design of this article.
Let us consider the following DAE model in the setup of Figure 1,
H(q)x[k] + L(q)y[k] + F (q)f [k] = 0, (1)
where x[k] ∈ Rnx represents the unknown signals such as the internal system states and natural disturbances,
y[k] ∈ Rny contains all the system outputs for the anomaly detection purpose, and f [k] ∈ Rnf stands for the
anomalies (e.g., FDI attacks) which are the targets of detection. The operator q can be treated as a type
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of time-shift operator that qx[k] → x[k + 1] for the time step k ∈ N, and H, L, F are polynomial matrices
in terms of the operator q with nr rows and nx, ny, nf columns separately. In what follows we show the
generality of the DAE model in (1) by introducing the example of a classical linear state-space representation
of the system dynamics, {
X[k + 1] = AX[k] +Bdd[k] +Bff [k],
Y [k] = CX[k] +Dff [k],
(2)
where X[k] ∈ RnX is the system state, Y [k] ∈ RnY is the measured output. The system input signals contain
the natural disturbances d[k] ∈ Rnd and the anomalies f [k]. Besides, A, Bd, Bu, C and Df are constant
matrices with appropriate dimensions. In light of (1) and (2), we can let x := [X> d>]> for the unknown
signals and y := Y for the system outputs such that (2) can be easily fitted into (1), by defining,
H(q) :=
[
−qI +A Bd
C 0
]
, L(q) :=
[
0
−I
]
, F (q) :=
[
Bf
Df
]
.
Note that the framework above is rich enough to subsume the system dynamics models of interest. In fact,
let us consider a typical closed-loop system where the electric power system is operated by a dynamic controller
that receives the measurements as inputs and sends control signals to the actuators through communication
networks which may be exposed to cyber attacks. Then when an FDI attack corrupts the measurements, it
affects the dynamics of the controller and consequently the involved power system. To study its behavior, we
can augment the physical system dynamics with the controller states and outputs, and a linear mathematical
model with augmented states and outputs can be derived in the form of (2) which again can be fitted into
the DAE model (1). In the next subsection we will provide such an example in the motivating case study.
Moreover, throughout this article we focus on the discrete-time models, but one can obtain similar results for
continuous-time models by changing the operator q in (1) to the distributional derivative operator [12].
Next, for the filter design in Figure 1, the outputs yp from the simulation results of the PF simulator are
available as inputs for the diagnosis task. In this article, we propose a linear time invariant diagnosis filter as
a type of residual generator which has a linear transfer operator, i.e.,
r[k] := R(q)yp[k], (3)
where the parameter R(q) with a predefined order is the design variable of the diagnosis filter. Unlike many
observer-based methods, the order of R(q) here can be much less than the dynamical system degrees, which
is always more desired for the online implementations in practice; see Section 4.
To highlight, our data-assisted model-based approach utilizes the model-based information from the DAE
framework in the preceding to introduce feasible sets for the design variable R(q). Due to the mismatch
of the DAE model and the one in the high-fidelity simulator, output mismatches can be observed from the
simulation results, and we use the simulation data to extract such output mismatch signatures as follows,
e[k] = yp[k]− y[k], ∀k ∈ N. (4)
Note that y is the output of the DAE model in (1). As shown in Figure 1, our proposed solution which
further has a tractable optimization-based characterization would use such signatures information from the
simulation data to form an objective function to-be-minimized regarding the effects of output mismatches on
the filter residual r. We will present the details of our proposed solution in Section 3.
2.2. Motivating case study: AGC modeled in PowerFactory
A motivating case study within the power systems can be the Automatic Generation Control (AGC) model
under cyber attacks. We will provide its DAE description and also the modeling process in the high-fidelity PF
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Figure 2. Three-area system with AGC functions in the PF.
simulator. The AGC is an automatic closed-loop system that regulates the power grid frequency. For a multi-
area power system, the AGC block in each area collects the frequency and tie-line power flow measurements
and sends control signals to the participating generators. After receiving the measurements, Area i would
calculate an area control error (ACE) signal,
ACEi = βi(ωi − ω0) + (Ptiei − Ptie0), (5)
where βi is the frequency bias, ωi and Ptiei denote the frequency and tie-line power flow measurements of
Area i, and ω0 and Ptie0 correspond to the nominal or scheduled values. The ACE value defines the frequency
to restore and the power to compensate in the event of load-generation imbalance. With the input of ACEi,
the AGC controller generates a control signal for Area i. This is usually a integral action, i.e.,
∆P˙agci = KIiACEi, (6)
where KIi is the integral coefficient and ∆Pagci is the control signal that is feeding into the governors of the
generators in Area i according to each generator’s participating factor.
The measurements and control signals above are usually transmitted through the typical supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) communication networks, which are still largely based on legacy technology,
and thus are vulnerable to cyber intrusions [19, 7]. For instance, an FDI attack can manipulate some tie-line
power flow measurements to corrupt the AGC process and consequently the system frequency stability. In the
work of such an analysis, each area of a power system is usually represented by a linearized model comprised
of equivalent rotating mass, governors and turbines [2]. With the linearized model and the linear equations for
corrupted AGC signals, the mathematical description of the AGC system under FDI attacks can be derived
in the form of (2) after discretization. We omit the details as this model information can be found in a lot of
existing work [2, 14].
Next, we also build the high-fidelity simulation model in the simulator PF for the 39-bus system equipped
with AGC functions. As shown in Figure 2, the 39-bus transmission network is divided into three areas: Area
1 consists of 2 generators (G 11, G 12) participating in AGC and 7 loads; Area 2 has 3 generators (G 21,
G 22, G 23) for AGC operations and 5 loads; Area 3 contains 2 generators (G 31, G 32) for AGC and 7
loads. Transmission lines called tie-lines (L 1-3-1, L 1-3-2, L 1-2, L 2-3) connect areas. In the simulations, the
dynamic generator model consists of a synchronous machine, along with automatic voltage regulator (AVR)
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Figure 3. The block definition of AGC in PowerFactory.
as the excitation system in the type of IEEE Type 1, turbine-governor model (GOV) in the type of IEEE
Type G1 (steam turbine) or IEEE Type G3 (hydro turbine). All the participated generators are with these
controls in the test case.
The AGC controllers have been developed by the DIgSILENT Simulation Language (DSL). The composite
frame builds the connections between the inputs and outputs of the AGC model elements. Then the AGC
block definitions for all areas can be created. For instance, Figure 3 illustrates the block definition of AGC in
Area 1, which has four sub-blocks,
• frequency deviations block where the frequency deviations in p.u. multiplied by β1 are calculated;
• tie-line power flows deviations block which computes the tie-line power flow deviations (normalized
in p.u.) on the side of Area 1 for the power part of ACE1;
• AGC controller block which performs the control action in (6) to generate ∆Pagc1 . To be noted, due
to saturation, the limits of Pminagc and P
max
agc are added for ∆Pagc1 ;
• AGC output signals block where the tuning signals for the participated generators in Area 1 for AGC
are calculated based on each generator’s participating factor.
The above block definitions are modeled using the Standard Macros of PowerFactory global Library. More-
over, in Figure 3, another block definition (in red diagram) corresponds to the FDI attack model for the study
of this article,
• FDI attacks block where the FDI attack is implemented. Each block captures the feature of the
stationary FDI attack 1 that it can add an “false” injection into the existing signal. One can specify
the occurrence time and the attack values. This block definition is achieved by using the digexfun
interface. With digexfun, we can define a specific DSL function (in C++) and create a dynamic link
library digexfun *.dll that the PF can load.
It has been noted in Figure 1 that there exist mismatches between the output yp from the PF simulator
and the one y from the DAE model. Indeed, the high-fidelity simulation model in the PF provides a more
1The attack occurs as a constant bias injection (f [k] = f) on measurements at a specific time step (k = kmin), and it remains
unchanged since then.
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detailed description of the power system with AGCs, comparing with the “abstract” linear mathematical
model (in the form of DAE) introduced in the preceding. In what follows we show how we can build a
scalable data-assisted model-based diagnosis filter whose performance is robust to such output mismatches.
3. Optimization-based Characterization of the Diagnosis Filter
3.1. Robust Anomaly Detection
We have restricted the diagnosis filter to a type of residual generator which has a linear transfer function in
(3). Considering the DAE formulation in Section 2.1 for the model-based detection, the residual generator can
be represented through the polynomial matrix equations. Thus for the transfer operator R(q), we introduce
R(q) := a(q)−1N(q)L(q). Then N(q) with the dimension of nr and a predefined order dN becomes the
filter design variable, if the scalar polynomial a(q) with sufficient order to make R(q) physically realizable is
determined. We can further have
r[k] = a(q)−1N(q)L(q)yp[k]
= a(q)−1N(q)L(q)(y[k] + e[k])
= − a(q)−1N(q)H(q)x[k]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)
− a(q)−1N(q)F (q)f [k]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(II)
+ a(q)−1N(q)L(q)e[k]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(III)
, (7)
where term (II) is the desired contribution from the anomaly f [ · ]. Ideally we would like to let the residual
keep insensitive to term (I) and (III). For that purpose, first we need to “quantify” the effects of output
mismatches on the filter residual. Thus for all k ∈ N, let us define
re[k] := a(q)
−1N(q)L(q)e[k] . (8)
Next, let us further denote the space of a discrete-time signal taking values in Rn over the horizon of T (i.e.,
k ∈ {1, · · · , T}) by MnT . We equip this space with an inner product and a corresponding norm as
‖v‖2L2 :=
〈
v, v
〉
,
〈
v, w
〉
:=
T∑
k=1
v>[k]w[k], (9)
where v, w are some elements in the space MnT .
In view of (7) and (9), we introduce a scalable and robust diagnosis filter characterized by a class of residual
generator which has the following features.
Definition 3.1 (Robust diagnosis filter). Consider the residual generator represented via a polynomial vec-
tor N(q) for a given a(q). This residual generator is robust with respect to output mismatches and can detect
all the plausible disruptive FDI attacks, if N(q) is the optimal solution from
min
N(q)
‖re‖2L2
s.t. N(q)H(q) = 0 , (10)
N(q)F (q)f 6= 0, ∀ f ∈ F ,
where F in term (II) is an admissible anomaly set. We emphasize that F can be adjusted according to different
anomaly scenarios where the convexity of the set is particularly desired from a computational perspective. For
instance, in the scenario of disruptive univariate attack (nf = 1), one can let F be a set of {f ∈ R : amin ≤
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f ≤ amax} where amin, amax ∈ R are non-zero variables decided by the attack targets on attack impact and
undetectability. Similarly, for multivariate attacks (nf > 1), we can introduce a set
F = {f ∈ Rnf : f = F>b α, α ∈ A} ,
where Fb := [f1, f2, . . . , fd] represents a finite basis for the set of disruptive attacks and α := [α1, α2, · · · , αd]> ∈
Rd contains the coefficients. A := {α ∈ Rd | Aα ≥ b} with A ∈ Rnb×d and b ∈ Rnb is a polytopic set to reflect
attack targets on attack impact and undetectability.
3.2. Tractable optimization-based characterization under univariate attack
To explain the robustification scheme of the diagnosis filter, let us first consider the univariate attack
scenario. Note that when there is no attack, the system outputs yp and y only depend on the input of natural
disturbances d. Thus for one instance of disturbances, di, one can have a specific signature ei according to
(4). For each ei ∈MnyT , a mismatch signature matrix Ei ∈ Rny×T can be introduced,
Ei :=
[
ei[1], ei[2], · · · , ei[T ]
]
. (11)
Recall that the operator q acts as a time-shift operator: qei[k] → ei[k + 1]. This operator is linear, and
it can be translated as a matrix left-shift operator for matrix Ei: qEi = EiD where D is a square matrix of
order T . Following this and the definition of the residual re in (8), we have
a(q)re = N(q)L(q)Ei = N¯L¯

I
qI
...
qdN I
Ei = N¯L¯Di , (12)
where the matrices are defined as N¯ := [N0, N1, · · · , NdN ], L¯ := diag[L, L, · · · , L] and L(q) = L. Here
Di := [E
T
i , (EiD)
T , · · · , (EiDdN )T ]T . Given a particular disturbance pattern di, the L2-norm of the
residual as defined in (9) can then be reformulated as a quadratic function,
‖rei‖2L2 = N¯QiN¯>, Qi = (L¯Di)G(L¯Di)>, (13)
where G is a positive semidefinite matrix with a dimension of T such that G(p, u) =
〈
a(q)−1bp, a(q)−1bu
〉
in
which bp, bu ∈M1T are the discrete time unit impulses.
Remark 3.2 (Training with multiple output mismatch signatures). In order to robustify the diagnosis filter, it
can be “trained” by utilizing the information of multiple instances of natural disturbances, i.e.,
{
di
}m
i=1
, in the
normal system operations (without attacks). For each disturbance signature di, the output mismatch signature
ei and also the matrices Ei, Di, Qi can be computed from (11) to (13). Next, according to (10) in Defini-
tion 3.1 and also (13), the robust diagnosis filter has an optimization-based characterization where the objective
function can be formulated to minimize N¯((1/m)
∑m
i=1Qi)N¯
> (average-cost viewpoint) or maxi≤m(N¯QiN¯>)
(worst-case viewpoint). We note that from computational perspective the average-cost is much more preferred.
Theorem 3.3 (Tractable quadratic programming characterization). Consider the polynomial matrices H(q) =
H0 +H1q and F (q) = F where H0, H1 ∈ Rnr×nx and F ∈ Rnr×nf are constant matrices. The robust diagnosis
filter introduced in (10) of Definition 3.1 for the univariate attack can be obtained by solving the program,
min
N¯
N¯(
1
m
m∑
i=1
Qi)N¯
>
s.t. N¯H¯ = 0 , (14)∥∥N¯ F¯∥∥∞ > 1 ,
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Algorithm 1 Diagnosis filter construction and validation for the simulator PF considering output mis-
matches.
1) Pre-training: For each j ∈ {1, . . . , 2dN + 2}, solve the program (LPj). Check if there exists γ?j > 0
and find the maximum of {γ?0 , γ?1 , · · · , γ?2dN+2}.
2) Training phase:
(i) For each instance di, run the PF simulations and compute the DAEs (in Matlab) to obtain yp and
y in the normal operations (without attacks). Calculate the matrices Ei, Di, and Qi according
to (11) - (13).
(ii) For a number of m instances of disturbances, perform the same process in (i).
(iii) Set the initial value of γj in (14) to be max{j≤2dN+2} γ
?
j from pre-training. Solve (14) with the
obtained matrix Qi. Tune the value of γj until it reaches maximum.
3) Testing phase: For another instance of disturbance with the same pattern as the ones in the
training phase, run the PF simulation where the FDI attacks are also launched. Run the resulted
diagnosis filter for detection.
where ‖ · ‖∞ denotes the infinite vector norm, and
H¯ :=

H0 H1 0 · · · 0
0 H0 H1 0
...
... 0
. . .
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 H0 H1
 .
Similar to the matrix L¯ in (13), F¯ is defined as F¯ := diag[F, F, · · · , F ]. Besides, a robust diagnosis filter
from the program (14) but simply replacing the last non-convex constraint with the following one can have
non-zero steady-state residual that approximates the attack value f ,
−a(1)−1
dN∑
i=0
NiF = 1. (15)
Proof. The key step is to observe that in (10) we can rewrite N(q)H(q) = N¯H¯[I, qI, · · · , qdN+1I]>,
and N(q)F (q) = N¯ F¯ [I, qI, · · · , qdN I]>. Note that in the scenario of univariate attack, one can directly
rewrite the last constraint of (10) as N(q)F (q) 6= 0, and scale this inequality to arrive at the one of (14).
Next, if N¯H¯ = 0, the diagnosis filter becomes r[k] = −a(q)−1N(q)F (q)f [k] + a(q)−1N(q)L(q)e[k]. If there
is no output mismatch, the steady-state value of the filter residual under the univariate attack would be
−a(q)−1N(q)F (q)f |q=1. Note that N(1)F (1) =
∑dN
i=0NiF . Thus when there exist output mismatches, with
the convex constraint of (15), the residual in its steady-state behavior could approximate f . 
Strictly speaking, the optimization program (14) is not a quadratic program (QP) due to the last non-
convex constraint. However, as explained by [12, Lemma 4.3], one can view (14) as a family of dN+1 standard
QPs.
3.3. Extension to multivariate attack scenarios
Inspired by the techniques developed in [18], we further extend the preceding design of the robust diagnosis
filter to the scenarios of multivariate attacks.
Corollary 3.4 (Robust diagnosis filter under multivariate attacks ). Consider the diagnosis filter in Def-
inition 3.1 where the set of multivariate attacks is defined as F = {f ∈ Rnf : f = F>b α, α ∈ A} where
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A = {α ∈ Rd | Aα ≥ b} (see Definition 3.1 for the denotation of these variables). Given j ∈ {1, . . . , 2dN+2},
for each j, consider a family of the following quadratic programs,
min
N¯,λ
N¯(
1
m
m∑
i=1
Qi)N¯
> ,
s.t. b>λ ≥ γj , (QPj)
(−1)jNbj/2cFFb = λ>A ,
N¯H¯ = 0, λ ≥ 0 ,
where b · c is the ceiling function that maps the argument to the least integer. Then, the best solution of the
programs (QPj) among j ∈ {1, . . . , 2dN + 2} solve the problem (10) in Definition 3.1 for the multivariate
attack scenarios.
Proof. In the scenario of multivariate attacks, the two constraints in (10) can be characterized by the robust
program,
γ? := max
N¯∈N
min
α∈A
{J (N¯ , α)}, (16)
where the set N := {N¯ ∈ R(dN+1)nr | N¯H¯ = 0}. The source of the cost function J (N¯ , α) is referred to [18,
Section IV.B]. Then, according to [18, Theorem IV.3], we know that the robust program can be reformulated
and relaxed to a set of linear programs (LPs),
γ?j := max
N¯, λ
b>λ
s.t. (−1)jNbj/2cFFb = λ>A, (LPj)
N¯H¯ = 0, λ ≥ 0 ,
Namely, the solution to the program (LPj) is a feasible solution to the robust program (16), and max{j≤2dN+2} γ
?
j ≤
γ?. Then it is easy to obtain the finite (QPj) for the multivariate attack scenarios. We conclude the proof by
noting that if there exist a γ?j > 0, then a resulted filter from (LPj) could detect all the admissible multivariate
attacks in the set F . 
From Corollary 3.4, we can see that for any j ∈ {1, . . . , 2dN +2}, if one can find a γj > 0 that (QPj) is still
feasible, then the solution to QPj offers a robust diagnosis filter in the type of Definition 3.1 for multivariate
attacks. For a better illustration, Algorithm 1 concludes the filter construction and validation process. In
the “pre-training phase”, one needs to solve (LPj) for each j to see if there exists γ
?
j > 0. If yes, next in the
“training phase”, Ei, Di and Qi can be obtained from the simulation data in the normal operations for each
disturbance signature di. Then the program (QPj) needs to be solved and the resulted robust diagnosis filter
can be “tested” to validate its performance.
In the end, we would like to highlight that the robust diagnosis filter from (QPj) does not necessarily
enforce a non-zero steady-state residual in multivariate attack scenarios. Regarding its steady-state behavior,
the program (16) can be modified into µ? := max{N¯∈N} min{α∈A} |N¯ F¯α| which has an exact convex
reformulation. Then a similar treatment as the one mentioned in Corollary 3.4 can be deployed.
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Figure 4. Residual signals of filters with or without robustification to output mismatches
under a univariate attack.
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Figure 5. The “energy” of the residual signals for the filters with or without robustification
under a univariate attack.
4. Numerical Results
4.1. Test System and Robust Detector Description
To validate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, the data-assisted model-based diagnosis filter has
been implemented in the high-fidelity PF simulator to detect FDI attacks on the AGC measurements in
the three-area 39-bus system. The AGC parameters of the linearized DAE model are referred to [4], and
the specifications of the system model in PF are available at [20]. Following Algorithm 1, to obtain output
mismatch signatures, we run the simulations to get the outputs yp and y with the same input d := ∆Pl in
the normal operations, where ∆Pl denotes the disturbance of load deviations. The adjustable degree of the
residual generator is set to dN = 3 which is much less than the order of the system dynamics; the scalar
polynomial a(q) is set to a(q) = (q − p)dN /(1− p)dN where p is a user-defined variable, acting as the pole of
R(q). We use CPLEX to solve all the corresponding optimization programs of this article.
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Figure 6. Residual signals of filters with or without robustification to output mismatches
under multivariate attacks.
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Figure 7. The “energy” of the residual signals for the filters with or without robustification.
4.2. Simulation Results
The first simulation considers the univariate attack scenario where an attacker has manipulated one tie-line
power flow measurement ∆Ptie1,2 from t = 30 s in the horizon of 60 s. To challenge the filter, the disturbances
are modeled as stochastic load patterns (load deviation of Load 4 in Area 1 is a random zero-mean Gaussian
signal). A number of m = 100 load disturbance instances are generated for the “training phase” where for each
load disturbance without attacks, the simulations with simulation time ts = 10 s are conducted individually to
obtain output mismatch signatures. The design variables N¯ are derived from (14) and to compare, a diagnosis
filter without robustification is also computed with the objective function max{N¯∈N} ‖N¯ F¯‖∞ which can be
transformed into finite LPs. In the “test phase”, the load disturbance has the same stochastic pattern with
the ones in the “training phase”. The simulation results are referred Figure 4 and Figure 5. Indeed, the
robust filter has significant improvements in mitigating the effects from output mismatches, while the filter
without robustification fails. The robust filter can also have non-zero steady-state residual to approximate
the univariate attack value. Figure 5 provides the residual results under 10 different realizations of load
disturbances in the “testing phase”. It depicts the “energy” of the residual signals for the last 10s, namely
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‖r‖L2 [ · ]. Note that in Figure 5b the threshold is set to τ? + 0.025, where the square of τ? equals to the
maximum value of N¯QiN¯ in the 100 training instances (i ∈ {1, · · · , 100};see (13)), and the added value is
to avoid possible false alarms according to [13].
In the second simulation, we move to the scenario of multivariate attacks. There are 5 vulnerable measure-
ments on the tie-lines between each areas, i.e., ∆Ptie1,2 , ∆Ptie1,3 , ∆Ptie1 , ∆Ptie2,3 and ∆Ptie2 , and correspond-
ingly there exist 3 basis vectors in the spanning set F : f1 = [0.1 0 0.1 0 0]T , f2 = [0.1 0.15 0.25 0 0]T ,
f3 = [0 0 0 0.1 0.1]
T (all in p.u.). Besides, for the set of disruptive multivariate attacks, the parameters
are set to A = 1> and b = 1.5 in A. Following Algorithm 1, the program (LPj) is solved. The optimal value
achieves maximum for j = 2 that γ?2 = 300, which implies a robust diagnosis filter. Next, in the “training
phase”, a number of 100 load disturbance instances are randomly generated. The program (QPj) is solved
for the robust diagnosis filter. For the derived N¯ , the multivariate attack coordinate vector α is obtained by
solving the inner minimization of the program (16). In the “test phase”, simulations in PF are conducted
that several realizations of load disturbances have been implemented and the multivariate attacks with α have
been launched. The performance of the two filters (the filter from (QPj) and the filter without robustification
from (LPj)) is validated with two sets of outputs: one from the DAE simulations (e ≡ 0) and another one
from the PF simulations (e 6= 0). Figure 6 shows the simulation results of both diagnosis filters. We can
see that both filters succeed for the case e ≡ 0. However, from Figure 6e and 6f, when there exist output
mismatches, the robust filter still works effectively, while the filter without robustification totally fails by
triggering “false alarms”. Besides, Figure 7 depicts the “energy” of the residual signals for the last 10s under
10 load disturbance instances. In Figure 7b, the threshold is set to τ? + 0.1 where the square of τ? equals to
the maximum value of N¯QiN¯ in the 100 training instances (i ∈ {1, · · · , 100}), and similarly the added value
is to avoid possible false alarms. Note that when looking into the steady-state behavior of the filter, it turns
out that µ? = 0, which indicates that the optimal multivariate attack in this case is a stealthy attack in the
long-term horizon, with or without considering the output mismatch effects. However, one can still detect
such attacks with a non-zero transient residual, as shown in Figure 6. In conclusion, these simulation results
validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.
5. Conclusion
In this article, we have proposed a feasible solution to the problem that arises from applying scalable model-
based anomaly detectors in practice: there always exist mismatches between the output from the mathematical
model and the one from the simulator (or the real electric power system). In the final reformulation, the
DAE model-based information introduces feasible sets, and the simulation data forms the objective function
to minimize the output mismatch effects, which could bridge the model-based and data-driven approaches.
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